THIS
is the second article aimed at two critical issues I broached the other day:
the first was the 27 October false flag attack on Makkah, in which I proved how
the Saudis had used a Houthi scud strike on Jeddah (65 kms from Makkah) to
garner sympathy for their war against Yemen, and to dupe the world into
believing that this was an Iranian-inspired assault.
The
second question refers to the fear, the loathing and the paranoia that has been
drip-fed into the veins of our community by a small, but vociferous Salafi
group on the question of the Shi’ah. These people seem to think that an
unequivocal, unqualified declaration of unbelief on another group is the Sunni way.
This has not been helped by geo-political events in Iraq and Syria, where the
toxic sludge of sectarian conflict has been deliberately stirred to muddy our own
perspectives.
Sectarianism is indeed a huge threat to harmony
amongst Muslim communities worldwide. It expresses
itself in groupthink, ignorance, bigotry, racism, arrogance, discrimination, hate-speech
and, ultimately, violence. It is an internal xenophobia that expresses our
inability to understand and to cope with our own differences.
The blanket
takfir of the Shi’ah – which is the
core question here – was taken to its extremes in the late 18th century when Shi’ah
blood was deemed halal by the
ideologue, Ibn ‘Abd ul-Wahhab. The consequence was that the son-in-law of Ibn
‘Abd ul-Wahhab, Ibn ‘Abd ul-‘Aziz ibn al-Sa’ud, led 12,000 brigands to plunder
the tomb of Sayyidina Hussein and to massacre over 3,000 Shi’ah at Karbala.
But if
truth be told, the sectarian coin has been played both sides in our history – sometimes
brutally. The first Safavid ruler, Shah Isma’il (d 1524 CE), purged Sunnism from
Persia at the point of a sword, and then used the skull of an opponent as a
drinking bowl. In modern-day Iraq, Sunnis have experienced Shi’ah recrimination
for Saddam Hussein and Da’esh. And Syria – a quagmire – has suffered its own nasty
narrative too.
But surely
the point is that faith-based intolerance can never be justified. Takfir is something to be detested. The
Prophet [saw] took the matter very seriously. He said (via Bukhari) that if we
declared takfir on another believer,
and were wrong, the verdict of kufr
would fall upon us.
This
was ignored by Islam’s first extremists, the 7th century Khawarij, who deemed you
kafir for disagreeing with them. Even
sin was kufr. They were unable to
understand that bad deeds made us a bad person, but not necessarily an
unbeliever.
The
Prophet [saw] forbade the early Muslims from judgement on people if they
uttered the testimony of faith. The illustrious Companion, Usama ibn Zayd, once
killed an idolater in battle after the latter had uttered, “there is no god but
Allah,” but when news reached the Prophet [saw] he had become angry and asked,
”how could you kill him after he has said ‘God is One?’”
Usama
had replied that the idolater had proclaimed these words with the sword of
death hanging over his head. To which the
Prophet [saw] had repeated: “ But how can you kill him after he said ‘La ilaha illallah?’” And Usama had
replied, “O, Messenger of Allah, he said it in dissimulation (taqiyyatan).”
To
which the Prophet [saw] had retorted: “Did you split his heart open to see?”
and the Prophet did not stop scolding him until Usama had wished he had not
entered Islam until after he had killed that man, just so that he might have
been forgiven his sins.
Prophetic wisdom
The
Prophetic wisdom behind this is husn
ul-dhann, the preference of the harbouring of good thoughts about another person. This is the
door to noble conduct. That is why the Prophet [saw] was so gentle with the Christians,
the Jews and the Zoroastrians. And, as the Qur’an [8: 61] says, “And if they incline to peace, then incline
to it [also].”
Sayyidina
‘Umar and Ibn Mas’ud, two historical giants of Islam, disagreed on over 100
juristic issues.
And yet when Ibn Mas’ud passed him one day, Sayyidina ‘Umar remarked, “There
comes a citadel full of wisdom and knowledge.” Sayyidina ‘Umar’s example is a
stark contrast to the 21st century, where the daggers of personal insult are unsheathed
at every turn.
Given
that of the Qur’an’s 6,000 plus verses only 500 (less than 8%) deal with ahkam, or legal rulings, it should be
clear that we have been encouraged not only to think, but to deal intelligently
with the challenges and differences of our time – on all levels.
As
Layth ibn Sa’d,
the eighth century faqih, said: “the
people of knowledge are the people of flexibility. Those who give fatwas never cease to differ, and so
this one permits something while that one forbids something, [but] without one
finding fault with the other when he knows of his position.”
In our
article, this is an important principle when examining the Shi’ah question, as
there are a host of scholarly views on the matter. I am not here to apologise
for the differences, but rather to reveal an emerging conciliatory discourse, which
it seems, some people – including certain clerics – simply don’t want to embrace
in the spirit of adab ul-ikhtilaf, the
honourable handling of divergent opinion.
Spurning
it on the grounds of Shi’i taqiyyah,
or dissemblance, is churlish. On the other hand, for any Shi’ah to push away
the hand of the Sunni on the spurious grounds that we are nawasib, or haters of the Ahlul Bayt, is also contrary to the
spirit of the Hadith of Usama ibn Zayd and the Holy Qur’an.
Convergence
The
point is that since the 2000s there has been a decisive convergence of thought
by Sunni and Shi’ah clerics to retreat from the divisive extremes that have for
so long blighted the narrative. Sulh,
or reconciliation, is recommended by Qur’an and Hadith. It is a sensible way to
peace.
Qur’an
(5: 8) says: “And let not hatred of others incite you to act unjustly: act justly,
that is nearer to piety…”
In (4:
94) we are instructed: “And do not say to anyone who offers you the greeting of
peace: ‘You are not a believer…’”
And in (49 : 10) we are advised: “So make
peace between your brothers, and fear Allah, so that Allah’s Mercy may rest on
you.”
And Hadith encourages: “Anyone who goes
to make peace between two persons, the angels of Allah send blessings upon him…”
In ‘western’
societies, such as ours, Muslim minorities reside in relative safety and peace.
Facebook pages spewing character assassination and fitnah, and fanatical Salafi palpitations over who has more claims
to be Muslim than the other, are trivialities compared to the global challenges
we face.
Faith discourse in South Africa
In
South Africa, faith discourse is understood on two levels. The first one is
constitutional in which all faiths are considered equal in the sense that all
citizens are equal.
There is no majoritarianism here; all faiths enjoy equal freedom of worship. However,
there are checks and balances written into our rights.
Freedom
of worship, based upon freedom of speech and freedom of association, are
contingent upon mutual respect.
Summarily declaring unbelief on someone in South Africa violates their basic human
rights; it is an act of structural violence indistinguishable from hate speech
and incitement, which are unconstitutional and against the law.
The
second level of faith discourse, the intra or internal one, is theological. Here
questions of belief within a specific group are interrogated, but they do still
have to reside in the cradle of constitutional principle.
To
understand things further, we have to delve into Islamic history to try to explain
what Sunnism and Shi’ism are. I am sure my limited definitions – admittedly
from a Sunni viewpoint – will not satisfy everybody, but let’s use them as a
starting point for our discussion.
Sunnis,
90% of all Muslims and alternatively known as the Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jama’ah (the community of the Prophetic Way), are
named ‘Sunni’ because they cling onto the Sunnah, or ways, of the Prophet [saw]
and are named ‘al-Jama’ah’ because they are united behind, as the Islamic Dictionary
says, ‘the imams, or leaders, of the
truth’.
Furthermore,
according to Sunni scholars, the Qur’an (2: 143) describes the Ahlus Sunnah as
the ‘middle nation’, a concept supported by the evidence of Sayyidah A’ishah – and
so many other Companions – that the Prophet [saw] never chose extremes in any
matter.
Shi’ism – followed by 9.5% of Muslims mostly in Iran,
Iraq, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Lebanon with significant minorities in Saudi
Arabia, Afghanistan, Syria, India and Pakistan – regards Sayyidina ‘Ali, the
fourth caliph and the son-in-law of Muhammad [saw], as his legitimate heir. It questions
the succession of the three caliphs – Sayyidina Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ‘Uthman – who
preceded him.
The schools of
Shi’ism
The word ‘Shi’ah’,
which means ‘party’, literally means the ‘party of ‘Ali’. Whilst, superficially,
the schism on Sayyidina ‘Ali’s caliphate appears to be political, the question
has been elevated to a theological precept.
There are three
schools of Shi’ism within the Islamic fold: Twelver Shi’ism, Isma’ili Shi’ism
and Zaydi Shi’ism. Twelvers
form the majority of the Shi’ah community. They cite twelve ‘infallible’ imams,
or divinely inspired leaders, from Sayyidina ‘Ali through Ja’fr ibn Sadiq to
the twelfth imam, the end-times Mahdi, who is waiting to appear. Twelvers
follow the madh-hab, or legal school
of thought, of Ja’fr ibn Sadiq.
The
Isma’ilis, named after Muhammad ibn Isma’il (d.809 CE), believe that there are
seven imams. This group ruled North Africa as the Fatimids from the 10-12th
centuries. Groups that splintered from the Isma’ilis are the Assassins, the
Druze, the Bohara, the Nizaris and the Nusayris. The Nusayris (called Alawites
in Syria) and the Druze are no longer regarded by the Shi’ah as Muslim.
The Zaydis, named after Zayd
ibn ‘Ali (d 740 CE) are found mostly in Yemen and believe in five imams. Interestingly, the Zaydis reject
the notion of ‘infallible’ imams, taqiyyah
and the idea of a ghayba, or hidden, spiritual
leader. The Zaydis also claim that the issue of Sayyidina ‘Ali’s caliphate was
a political one – which is the Sunni viewpoint.
 |
| Ghadir Kumm |
Shi’ism originated from disputes
over political succession
Shaykh Abd ul-Hakim Murad of
Cambridge University
says that Shi’ism originated from disputes over political succession, with
doctrinal differences only creeping in later. And whilst Sunnis believe in
Qur’an and all the validated body of Ahadith, Shi’ism focuses on the traditions
of the Ahlul Bayt – the Prophetic family – via Fatimah (the Prophet’s daughter)
and Sayyidina ‘Ali’s descendants.
At the heart of Shi’ah
conviction is the Hadith of Ghadir Kumm,
a pond near Al-Juhfah between Makkah and Madinah, where a group of Muslims
gathered after the noble Prophet’s final pilgrimage. The Hadith is also known
as Hadith ul-Thaqalayn, the tradition of two weighty matters
and the event, ‘Eid ul-Ghadir, is celebrated by the Shi’ah. On this day the
Prophet [saw] is reported to have said:
“It seems as if the time is
approaching when I shall be called away and I shall answer that call. I am leaving
you two precious things and if you adhere to both of them, you will never go
astray. They are the Book of Allah and my progeny, the Ahlul-Bayt. The two
shall never separate from each other until they come to me by the Pool of
Paradise.”
‘Then the Prophet [saw]
continued: “Do I not have more right over the believers than what they have over
themselves?”’
‘The people cried, “Yes, O
Messenger of God.” Then the Prophet [saw] held up the hand of Sayyidina ‘Ali
and said, “Whoever I am his leader (mawla),
then ‘Ali is his leader (mawla). O, Allah,
love those who love him, and be hostile to those who are hostile to him.”’
The Shi’ah declare that this indicates
the Prophet’s [saw] choice of Sayyidina ‘Ali as the first caliph. Sunni
scholars argue against the idea, as Hadith ul-Thaqalayn was narrated in front
of a small gathering of people at Ghadir Khumm, which was a half-way point to
Madinah. It was directed only towards those living in Madinah, because the
Prophet’s family lived there, and thus, the task of taking care of them would have
fallen upon their shoulders.
Sunni scholars maintain that if
the Hadith ul-Thaqalayn had meant what the Shi’ah imply then the Prophet [saw] would
have said it in front of all the Muslims during his Farewell Sermon. The Sunni
scholars refer the mention of Sayyidina ‘Ali to a group of soldiers
harshly criticising him. It was in response to this abuse and disrespect that
the Prophet [saw] found it necessary to defend his family.
Shi’ah cosmos
Nonetheless, the Shi’ah cosmos emanates
from this Hadith via the notion that Sayyidina ‘Ali should have been the first
caliph, and not the fourth one. The Battle of the Camel also informs the
narrative. A confusing and tragic event – originating from dissatisfaction
surrounding Sayyidina ‘Ali’s response to the third Caliph Sayyidina ‘Uthman’s
assassination – the battle was fought in Basra between the forces of Sayyidah
A’ishah and Sayyidina ‘Ali in 656 CE.
Indeed, it is from the above
that the most noteworthy schism between Sunni and Shi’ah emerges. From a
political sense of victimisation of Sayyidina ‘Ali being taken to doctrinal extremes,
there emerged an unfortunate thesis of marginalisation involving the cursing of
Sayyidah A’ishah, the three previous Caliphs and those Companions seen as being
outside of the Ahlul Bayt.
The fanatical Salafi sect has
used this to declare unqualified takfir
on all Shi’ah, despite the fact that the Shi’ah have been performing the Hajj with
Sunnis for over 1,400 years. Had
there been a blanket declaration of takfir
by early Sunni scholars (something they were always cautious about) this would
not have been the case.
Imam Malik and Imam Shafi’i have
specifically stated that those who cursed the wives of the Prophet [saw], the
three imams and the Companions were rawafid
– or rejecters – and they forbid their followers from praying behind them. The
Sunni imams always specified whom they were addressing, and the idea they ever
made unqualified takfir on all Shi’ah
in this case is absurd.
Imam Shafi’i’s reading was that
praying behind a rafid, whilst a bida’h mufassiqah (and not a bid’ah mukaffirah leading to unbelief) was
makruh, ‘disliked, but not haram’. This is not an unqualified declaration
of kufr by Imam Shafi’i, as so many
like to claim.
Imam Shafi’i’s argument was that the rawafid
were chiefly mubtadis, or undesirable
innovators. Again, only the fanatical Salafis via Al-Qaeda and Da’esh declare takfir on those grounds.
What has to be taken into
account too are Shi’ah ghulat,
extremists whom the Shafi’i commentator, Shaykh Ahmad Naqib al-Masri, dismisses
as the purveyors of ‘gibberish’. In fact, for extolling the virtues of the
Ahlul Bayt, Imam Shafi’i was severely criticised for being a Shi’ah
sympathiser. He responded in verse:
O, Pilgrims! On your way to the
House of Allah, pause shortly
In the sands of Muzdalifah.
At dawn, when the caravans of
pilgrims move toward Mina,
Like a roaring river, call upon
them and say:
“If love of the Prophet’s
family means ‘rafd’,
Then let mankind know, that
surely I am a ‘Rafidi.’”
Abu Hanifah and Imam Malik both
condemned the rawafid, but a close
examination of their statements and refutations – and the context of their condemnatory
utterances – reveals that they were chiefly targeting the ghulat element.
Some Shi’ah textbooks do not
shy away from ghuluw, or extremism.
Ghulam Hasan Muharrami writes in the History
of Shi’ism
that one of the dangers threatening Shi’ism throughout its history has been
extremism and the attribution of extremist views to the Shi’ah. Muharrami adds
that a common strain of these people is their fanaticism with regards to the
imams by ‘blasphemously elevating their station to the station of divinity.’
Contradictions
Of course, academically, there
are certain contradictions perceived in the Shi’ah discourse by Sunni scholars that
do need exegesis. Allamah Baqir Majlisi,
the 17th century mujtahid and
Safavid – an anti-Sufi and supra-rationalist who became the father of the
Iranian mourning ceremonies – profanes the ashab,
in spite of a warm relationship with the Mughal ruler, Aurangzeb, who was a
Sunni.
Then there is Abu Ja’fr
al-Kulayni, the 9th century scholar celebrated for his Hadith collection Al-Kafi, regarded as something of a
Shi’ah primer. Some 60% of his collected Ahadith are regarded as da’if, or weak, in their chains of transmission.
Nonetheless, Al-Kulayni has been quoted as saying: “Compare them [my collected
Ahadith] to the book of Allah. Take whichever of them concurs with the book of Allah—Almighty
is He and Sublime—and reject whichever of them contradicts the Book of Allah.”
This practice is not scholastically
extraordinary. Sunni scholars also justify the use of weak Ahadith, as long as
they are not used for legal application. This was the practice of Imam
al-Ghazali in his Ihya, and he was a refuter
of the Shi’ah.
Rawafid refutations by the Sunni imams
mostly refer to those who curse Sayyidah A’ishah and the Companions – something
now publically condemned by prominent Shi’ah scholars. Some of the Sunni
commentary focuses on matters of ‘aqidah,
or basic belief, and Abu Hanifah has a treatise on the imamat. There is little of fiqh,
or application of Shari’ah. However,
Imam Hanbal does argue that Ja’fr ibn Sadiq
(the Shi’ah mujtahid) did not support
mut’ah, or temporary marriage.
But back to the issue of takfir. It is somewhat ironic that the Sunni
ethos of response to unbelief has been directly inspired by the noble conduct
of Sayyidina ‘Ali towards the Khawarij, who not only declared him kafir, but eventually assassinated him.
The background is that after
the murder of Sayyidina ‘Uthman, Sayyidina ‘Ali – facing many political
challenges – had moved cautiously on the killers. This had not pleased the aggrieved
Umayyads, who wanted immediate reparation. Amongst them were Mu’awiyah ibn
Sufyan, the governor of Damascus, who’d refused to pledge allegiance to
Sayyidina ‘Ali because of this.
It had resulted in the Battle
of Siffin (near modern-day Raqqa) between Sayyidina Mu’awiyah and Sayyidina
‘Ali in 657 CE. It had seen 70,000 Muslim casualties with Mu’awiyah’s forces
ceasing hostilities by sticking Qur’ans on their spears. The upshot was that
Sayyidina ‘Ali, on the verge of victory but wanting to prevent further
bloodshed, agreed to arbitration – something which incensed a faction of his
troops who felt that Allah alone should be the arbitrator.
 |
| Modern-day Khawarij |
The Khawarij reject ‘Ali
These men, known as the Qurra – or Qur’anic reciters – then seceded (kharaja) from ‘Ali to
become the Khawarij or Kharijites.
Avid in their recitals, but extremist in every other fashion as predicted in
Hadith,
they then deemed Sayyidina ‘Ali kafir and
also refused to recognise his caliphate.
In spite of their hostility to
him – and entreaties by his lieutenants to declare them kafir – Sayyidina ‘Ali acted with the utmost liberality, saying
that the Khawarij had uttered the kalimah
shahadah, the testimony of faith, and if they did not break any bounds, the
Sunnis could marry them and worship with them.
However, the Kharijites did
break the bounds in 659 CE when they butchered the governor of Nahrawan, ‘Abdullah
ibn Khabbab ibn al-Aratt, and gutted his pregnant maidservant. After Sayyidina
‘Ali’s envoy was murdered too, he was forced to react and the Kharijite
rebellion was put to the sword, only nine of them surviving. Two years later
Sayyidina ‘Ali was killed in a Kufa mosque by Ibn Muljam, a Kharijite, with a
poisoned sword.
The Kharijites are a key factor
in the narrative. Dhul Khuwaysara, who had so rudely challenged the Prophet
[saw] on the spoils of war, became a Kharijite leader. Sayyidina ‘Ali had
predicted after Nahrawan that the Kharijites would not be eradicated. If one
considers that the Najdi Salafi-Wahhabis are their descendants, contemporary
history comes into focus via the Karbala massacre of 1802, Al-Qaeda in the
1990s and Da’esh in the 2000s.
Shi’ah distaste for the fanatical
Salafis, whose ideologues have deemed their blood halal, is deeply rooted. Tragically, the influx of foreign fanatical
Salafi mujahidin into places such as
Iraq and Syria – at the behest of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other international
seditionists – has created a sectarian cesspool, with Hezbollah and the Iranian
Republican Guard becoming equally shady players in the Middle East’s most
destructive conflict since the Mongol hordes.
 |
| Shaykh Shaltut |
Contemporary rapprochement
between Sunni and Shi’ah was initiated by Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut of the Al-Azhar
University in 1959 – and whilst we acknowledge certain parties are never going
to accept what we say – the matter is worth pursuing because of its noble
intent. The antagonist’s view that Shaykh Shaltut’s fatwa on the Shi’ah is either ‘errant’ or ‘old’, and hence
inapplicable, is preposterous and would mean that all our fiqh books would have to be re-written.
Shaykh
Shaltut is remembered for encouraging harmonious relationships between Sunni and
Shi’ah. He maintained cordial relations with prominent figures, such as Ayatollah Sayyid Hossein Borujerdi , and zealously campaigned for open discussion and
co-operation.
Shaykh Shaltut’s fatwa about the Shi’ah madh-hab
(or school of thought) is still seen today as a symbol of hope for
reconciliation. Shaykh Shaltut strove to portray Islam to the world as a
religion of unity and moderation. In this process, he sent a letter to Shi’ah
scholar, Allamah Muhammad Taqi al-Qumi, in response to a question of whether Sunni
Islam prohibited the Shi’ah school of thought.
Significantly, Shaykh Shaltut addressed the scholar
as ‘Dear Muslim’, indicating that takfir did not apply. The
second clause in Shaltut’s letter states: “The Ja’fari school of thought, which is also known
as Al-Shi’ah al-Imamiyyah Ithna ‘Ashariyyah, is a school of thought which is
religiously correct to follow as other Sunni Schools of thought.”
Shaykh Shaltut also had a dialogue with Shi’ah
scholars on five major questions. The reader can make up his mind on the
answers. The first was on the issue of the Qur’an being incomplete, some verses
allegedly being omitted. The scholars replied that this was based on weak
evidence, and so the Qur’an as it is read today, is the correct version.
Testimonies
This is supported by the testimonies of over 20
Shi’ah scholars from Shaykh Saduq and Sayyid Murtada in the early centuries to
Ayatollah al-Khu’i in the 20th century, who all refute the idea that the Qur’an
was corrupted.
The Shi’ah scholars were closely questioned by the
Azhari shuyukh on the concept of bada’a, the idea that Allah could change
his immutable decree. The Azhari scholars were told that this was merely the
notion of nasikh and mansukh, the concept of abrogating and
abrogated verses as reflected in the Qur’an.
On taqiyyah
– something allowed by Imam Shafi’i only if a Muslim’s life is under threat –
the scholars said they were merely repeating the madh-hab, or school of thought, of an oppressive ruler or hostile country
for the purpose of protecting themselves.
On the highly emotive topic of demeaning Prophetic
Companions, the scholars replied it was misunderstood. One could make three
typical responses. Firstly, one could say the person was kafir. Secondly, one could insult that person. And thirdly, one
could criticise that person. The scholars said that the third category was the
one that applied, and that they reserved the right to ‘criticise’ the
historical narrative.
To this effect, top Iranian scholar, Grand
Ayatollah Makarim Shirazi, has said: “We cannot close our eyes to history [and
historical differences]; insulting is
one thing while research is something
else—these two should never be confused with one another.”
The fifth matter referred to the reported ‘ismah, or ‘infallibility’, of the
imams. The Shi’ah scholars argued that the imams – who had to possess the best
of characters before ‘recognition’ – were faultless sources of law due to their
chain of authority going back to the truly infallible source of law, the
Prophet [saw]. The Azhari scholars had allegedly asked why statements then had
to be appropriated to the imams, as opposed to the Prophet [saw].
Serious rapprochement between
Shi’ah and Sunni began in 1979, just after the revolution in Iran, when
Ayatollah Khomeini forbid the Shi’ah from making disparaging remarks about
Sunnis. In 1982, an annual Week of Unity was introduced to promote dialogue. In
1991 Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei, founded the World Forum for
Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, today headed by Ayatollah Mohsen
Araki, a cleric born in the Iraqi town of Najaf.
'War on Terror'
Since 9/11 and the ‘War on
Terror’, sectarianism has become a major headache in the Muslim world —
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria reeling from the consequences of
irresponsible and ill-considered foreign interventions. To this effect, the
ayatollahs in Iraq have taken a strong stand against sectarianism, particularly
when the Shi’ah dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq appeared to
condone sectarian violence.
This led to Iraqi Grand
Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Sistani saying in 2013 at a conference in Najaf that the
spilling of Iraqi blood, especially Sunnis, was forbidden. There was no
difference between Sunnis, Shi’ites, Kurds or Christians; the rights of Sunnis
must be protected at all costs by the Shi’ah majority, he said.
Sistani had previously ruled
that a Shi’ah woman could marry a Sunni if there was agreement and that funeral
prayers could be said over a Sunni and that Sunni and Shi’ah could inherit from
each other. He ruled that while Sunnis rejected the imamate, it did not make them
unbelievers.
The Al-Azhar Shaykh, Muhammad
Abu Zahra, reciprocates in his work Tarikh
al-Madha-hib al-Islamiyyah: “There is no doubt that Shi’ism is an Islamic
sect. If we exclude examples like the Saba’ah who considered ‘Ali as being God,
and others like them (knowing that the Saba’ah are considered infidels in the
opinion of the Shi’ites) there is no doubt that everything this sect says is
related to Qur’anic verses or sayings related to the Prophet [saw].”
He adds: “They are friendly
towards those Sunnis who become their neighbours and they do not repel them.”
This is corroborated by
Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Saeed al-Hakimi of Najaf who said: “The Sunnis are
not the enemies of the Ahlul Bayt even if they did not follow them or believe
in their imamate. They – in general – love the Ahlul Bayt. Our imams ordered us
to associate with them in kindness and to communicate with them regularly.”
Cursing
 |
| Ayatollah 'Ali Khameini |
With regards to cursing, Iran’s
Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamenei ruled in September 2010: “Insulting the symbols of the Sunni brothers,
including the Prophet Muhammad’s wife (Sayyidah A’ishah) is haram. This includes the women of all
prophets and especially the holy Prophet Muhammad [saw], the leader of all
Prophets.”
The Fatwa was issued in
response to a query by a group of Shi’ah scholars and intelligentsia in Al-Ahsa,
Saudi Arabia. The query was made after one extremist Shi’ah cleric, Shaykh’
Yasser al-Habib, had publicly insulted Sayyidah A’ishah.
Grand Ayatollah Makarim Shirazi
responded to the issue thus: “Recently a pseudo scholar, an ignorant person…has
shockingly abused the wives of the Noble Prophet [saw], and has insulted some
holy entities of other sects and has accused wives of the Prophet [saw] of
inappropriate things.
“Either this person is paid [by
the enemies], or is foolish and a lunatic…this is in spite of the fact that
hundreds of Shi‘ah scholars have condemned this act...our condemnation was
publicised in the global Velayat Channel,
and we have condemned every kind of insult of the wives of the Prophet [saw].”
Though cautious, this ethos –
of recognition rather than resentment – has started to emerge internationally. A
shining example, writes Professor Syed Farid Alatas of the National University
of Singapore, is that of the Sultanate of Oman.
He says that although the Ibadis
of Oman, neither Sunnis nor Shi’ites, make up about 75% of the population, Oman
is probably the one country that allows for the greatest harmony between the Sunni
and the Shi’ah. Omani basic law prohibits discrimination based on religion. It
protects the rights of different religious communities to practice their
religions on the condition that there is no disruption of the public order.
Washington Declaration
In September 2013 the Islamic
Society of North America ISNA) signed an agreement of mutual respect, the
Washington Declaration, between Sunni and Shi’ah. Clause One of the eight point declaration states: “All Muslims are one nation, even if the schools of thought
are diverse. Such diversity is a source of intellectual enrichment and should
not be the cause of accusations of disbelief, murder, and the desecration of
sanctities.”
In Lucknow, India, a city where Sunni-Shi’ah relations have
been decidedly strained, a local campaign called ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ has
initiated joint ‘Eid prayers for the second year running.
Finally, we proceed to a
document called The Amman Message, a visionary
and progressive initiative, which was sparked by King ‘Abdullah of Jordan to
tackle the question of sectarianism plaguing 21st century Islam. It started as a detailed statement released on
the eve of the 27th of Ramadan 1425 AH / 9th November 2004 CE in Amman, Jordan’s
capital.
It sought to declare what Islam
was and what it was not, and what actions represented it and what actions did
not. Its goal was to clarify to the modern world the true nature of Islam and
the nature of true Islam.
In order to give this statement
religious authority, King Abdullah sent the following three questions to 24 of
the most senior scholars in the world. The questions were: (1) “Who is a
Muslim?” (2) “Is it permissible to declare someone an apostate?” And (3) “Who
has the right to issue fatwas?”
Based on the rulings provided
by these scholars, King ‘Abdullah convened an international Islamic conference
of 200 of the world’s leading Islamic thinkers from 50 countries. In Amman, they
unanimously issued a ruling on three fundamental issues, which became known as
the ‘Three Points of the Amman Message’:
Validity of all eight madha-hib
They recognised the validity of
all eight madha-hib (legal schools)
of Sunni, Shi’ah and Ibadi Islam; of traditional Islamic theology (Ash’arism);
of Islamic mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought, and came to a
precise definition of who is a Muslim.
Based upon this definition they
forbade takfir (declarations of
apostasy) between Muslims. Based upon the madha-hib
they set forth the subjective and objective preconditions for the issuing of fatwas by qualified scholars, thereby
exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name of Islam.
These Three Points were then
unanimously adopted by the Islamic world’s leadership at the Organization of
the Islamic Conference summit at Makkah in December 2005.
And over a period of one year,
the Three Points were unanimously adopted by six more international Islamic
scholarly assemblies, culminating with the International Islamic Fiqh Academy
of Jeddah, in July 2006. In total, over 500 leading Muslim scholars worldwide endorsed
the Amman Message and its Three Points.
In his foreword to the Amman
Message, King Abdullah had stressed that the consensus from it did not represent
‘the opinion of one man, one ethnic group, one country, or even a group of
countries’. Nor did it represent one school of thought in Islam. It represented
a unanimous agreement of all Muslims by their religious authorities, and even
political leaders.
When discussing the Amman Message we cannot ignore the
protestations of the Pakistani Deobandi scholar, Mufti Taqi Uthmani, that he
did not sign the Three Points, despite the official Amman Message indicating he
endorsed the first version and signed off on the second. Much is made of this
by Sunni takfiris to say that the
Amman Message has lost all its credibility.
What we do know is that the Mufti was asked by King
‘Abdullah to submit a fatwa, which he
did. A reading of it indicates that the venerable Mufti does not deviate from
the mainstream Ahlus Sunnah position of the Sunni imams, and does not allow
unqualified takfir of other groups.
Unrestricted takfir
is not established
A website* featuring his fatwa summarises it thus: “Unrestricted takfir of the Shi’ah is not established according to the majority
of the ‘ulama. However, this does not
mean that Shi’ah misguidance is in any doubt. Those Shi’ah have not been
labelled kafir but are, without doubt,
misguided and astray.”
Mufti Uthmani, whose view has been wrongly conflated with
the naked takfir of other Deobandi ‘ulama, is prefaced by him warning
against Muslims indulging in the extremes of excess and negligence. He explains
that as long as a person abides by the primaries of the faith, it is not permissible
to declare unbelief based on secondary differences.
But let’s go back to the Amman Message allegedly losing its
integrity due to Mufti Taqi Uthmani’s disavowals of having endorsed it, and in
spite of his fatwa not deviating much
from its final version.
Scholars such as Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin Bayah (Mauritania),
Shaykh Mustafa Ceric (Bosnia), Shaykh Hassan al-Saqqaf (Jordan), Habib
al-Saqqaf (Hijaz), Prof. Tariq Ramadan (Switzerland), Shaykh Nuh Keller
(Jordan), Sayyid Hossein Nasser (USA), Shaykh Hamza Yusuf (USA), Shaykh ‘Abd
al-Hakim Murad (Great Britain) and Habib ‘Umar ibn Hafidh (Yemen) are amongst
the hundreds who have stood firm on the Three Points.
The doyenne of
the ikhwan and the temperate wing of Salafist
movement, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, has also broken away from the tenets of the
Three Points, the takfiris claiming
that his personal view has nullified the Amman Message and the opinions of hundreds
of other qualified scholars. Exasperated and incensed by geo-political events
in Syria – as most of us are – he has apparently used it as the basis for
declaring that he has wasted his life on fostering Sunni-Shi’a unity.
Formerly a
supporter of Hezbollah’s 2006 war against Israel, he sees its Syrian
intervention at the behest of Iran as outright treachery. This has led to him
to say that in unity only the Shi’ah benefit; and that it is a pretext for them
to propagate Shi’ism in Sunni countries.
South African response
The Amman Message was also endorsed
by a representative of the United ‘Ulama Council of South Africa, who in turn,
represented all the country’s major ‘ulama
bodies such as the Jami’at ul-‘Ulama, the Sunni ‘Ulama Council and the Muslim
Judicial Council.
The representative endorsed the
Three Points at the Forum of Muslim ‘Ulama and Thinkers in Makkah in 2005. This
meant that South African Muslims would not regard the Shi’ah as apostates under
the conditions of the Message.
However, to hear the surprising
apologia (from other sources) that the endorsement was merely a signature of an
‘attendance register’ is a startling bon voyage to reality. The truth is that
our major ‘ulama bodies agreed with
the three principles of The Amman Message, and if they have departed from them,
it is an utterly despicable betrayal of trust.
In conclusion, these are not
the esoteric utterances of a ‘devious Sufi’, a ‘Wahhabi hater’ or a
‘sympathiser’ – as some antagonists have
so loudly proclaimed – but an appeal to the conscience of my brothers and
sisters to stop indulging in hate speech and to cease declaring wholesale
unbelief on those with a different world-view to theirs. We do not expect
Shi’ah and Sunni to agree on all questions, obviously, but we do hope for the
precept of ‘you to yours’, and ‘me to mine’ without the baggage of
recrimination.
Rather, we need to embrace the adab ul-ikhtilaf, the honour of difference,
where to listen means to hear, where to respect means to receive respect – and
where to love means to attract love. The point is if someone says the same kalimah shahadah as me, fasts the same
fast as me, prays five times a day like me, pays the same Zakah as me and
performs Hajj with me, I have no right to deny him the Prophetic embrace of
being a Muslim.
As one of my Shaykhs has said:
there is absolutely no positive outcome in creating divisions between Shi’ah
and Sunni. To take reactionary stands, and to embrace acrimonious attitudes,
invariably finds Muslim pitted against Muslim while Islam’s enemies look gleefully
on.
